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Solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily
stabilize global temperatures. A key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over
the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the
country with the strongest incentive for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose
a substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of
counter-geoengineering technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar
geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favor of in-
ternational cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of countries with asymmetric
preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding so-
lar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that counter-geoengineering
prevents the free-driver outcome, but not always with benign effects. The presence
of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage
in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare
effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type
of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or cooperative deployment of
solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends
crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries.
Keywords: climate intervention; solar geoengineering; counter-geoengineering; free-
driver; strategic conflicts; game theory; cooperation; externality; global warming;
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1 Introduction
One option for addressing climate change that is gaining increased attention is Solar
Geoengineering (SG), also known as Solar Radiation Management (SRM) (National
Research Council 2015). SG aims at (partially) compensating the global warming caused
by increased atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases by either releasing cooling particles in
the stratosphere (stratospheric aerosol injection) or modifying marine cloud reflectivity
(marine cloud brightening). While an optimally designed and implemented SG scheme
appears to have the potential to reduce global temperature damages (Moreno-Cruz et al.
2012; Keith and MacMartin 2015; National Research Council 2015), there are concerns
that SG’s potential benefits are reduced and possibly even reversed in a decentralized
world of international ’anarchy’. A key fear is that presumably low deployment costs
(McClellan et al. 2012; Smith and Wagner 2018) together with asymmetric preferences
over the optimal global temperature change (Heyen et al. 2015) may result in unilateral
SG deployment that harms the rest of the world (Horton 2011; National Research Council
2015; Pasztor et al. 2017). This has been termed the “free-driver” problem (Weitzman
2015).1
Against this backdrop of potentially welfare deteriorating strategic incentives sur-
rounding a potentially beneficial technology, a recent paper (Parker et al. 2018) explores
the idea of counter-geoengineering (CG), or a set of technologies that would give coun-
tries threatened by or subject to the free-driver’s whims a tool for quickly negating what
they regard as harmful SG. While states opposed to unilateral SG could impose a variety
of indirect costs (such as trade sanctions) on a free-driver in an effort to halt deployment
(Horton 2011), CG would entail a direct response intended to curb such behavior. CG
could take one of two forms. ’Neutralizing’ CG would entail rendering SG particles inert
by, for example, injecting a base to counteract the sulphate aerosols most commonly
considered for SG, or employing techniques to accelerate the coagulation and hence at-
mospheric deposition of SG particles. By contrast, ’countervailing’ CG would involve
reversing the effects of SG particles by releasing warming agents such as greenhouse
gases or specially engineered solid particles to counter the change in radiative forcing
caused by SG. Both forms of CG are possible, but neither currently exists; successful
development would require achieving adequate forcing efficacy at reasonable cost. The
reason why the availability of such CG capabilities might prove beneficial is obviously
1The ’free-driver’ terminology emphasizes two things: first, the public good nature of interventions
in the global climate, i.e. non-excludability and non-rivalry; and second, the potential for a single actor
to get in the ’driver seat’ (due to low deployment costs) and shape the global climate as she wishes, in
contrast to the well-known ’free-rider’ problem (Stavins 2011). To emphasize heterogeneous preferences,






















not because further global warming is globally desirable; rather, the very availability
of CG might deter the free-driver from unilateral SG deployment and instead promote
international cooperation on climate interventions. If CG has this potential to steer
climate technology use to overall beneficial levels, then there is a case for countries to
invest in CG today as a deterrent to future unilateral SG use.
The present paper provides a first rigorous analysis of the strategic effects of intro-
ducing SG and CG into an otherwise standard model of climate economics. We regard
SG and CG as two separate and contrasting forms of climate intervention. With this
understanding, we model climate intervention (via either SG or CG) as a public good
game: the operational costs of any climate intervention are borne only by the deploy-
ing country, whereas the resulting global temperature change affects all countries. The
latter is captured by a non-monotonic benefit function that exhibits an optimal level
of global temperature change. A key assumption in our model is that countries dis-
agree about the optimal temperature change and therefore their preferred amount of
climate intervention. We give countries two distinct options for cooperation. The first
is a deployment treaty where countries jointly decide on the climate intervention that
maximizes the coalition’s overall payoff. The second option, which constitutes one of
the novel contributions of the present paper, is a moratorium treaty. In a moratorium,
an idea often raised in the geoengineering debate (Parker 2014; Victor 2008; Zürn and
Schäfer 2013; Parson and Keith 2013), countries commit themselves to abstain from any
form of climate intervention. As usual, we assume each country individually determines
its willingness to cooperate by comparing payoffs under alternative treaties to the non-
cooperative outcome. We study how CG affects the incentives to cooperate by analyzing
the game first when only SG is available and hence climate intervention is restricted to
cooling; and second when CG is also available and countries are able to cool or warm.
Despite this parsimonious setting, our model delivers a rich set of findings. In the
absence of CG, if countries are sufficiently different in their preferred temperature, the
non-cooperative outcome is a free-driver equilibrium. If countries have similar preferred
temperatures, then the non-cooperative outcome is a free-rider equilibrium. In both
cases, cooperation incentives are overall weak: The moratorium treaty is never supported
by both countries and therefore unstable, and the deployment treaty is only stable for a
relatively small set of parameter constellations. The effect of introducing CG is that the
free-driver constellation is not a Nash equilibrium anymore: those who regard the free-
driver’s cooling as excessive now have a tool to counteract it, and they use it. Absent the
opportunity to cooperate, this results in a ’climate clash’, an escalation of cooling by SG
and warming by CG that typically has no winners and is overall sharply detrimental.
If cooperation is an option, however, this bleak outlook of CG in a non-cooperative
world may encourage countries to work together. In particular, the free-driver, typically
unwilling to cooperate in the absence of CG, may be ready to compromise on the amount





















a destructive climate clash. And even if cooperation does occur, it might take the form
of a moratorium, which could be worse than the free-driver outcome if climate damages
are sufficiently high. The outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in
temperature preferences between countries.
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. The first is the emerging liter-
ature on strategic interaction and governance surrounding solar geoengineering (Klepper
and Rickels 2014; Horton 2011; Barrett et al. 2014; Barrett 2014). We make three specific
contributions to this literature. The first pertains to research on non-cooperative geo-
engineering outcomes under different types of asymmetry (Moreno-Cruz 2015; Manoussi
and Xepapadeas 2017; Manoussi et al. 2018; Urpelainen 2012; Weitzman 2015; Heyen
2016). These papers, with the exception of Weitzman (2015) and Heyen (2016), focus on
asymmetry in terms of heterogeneous side-effects or different levels of uncertainty but
maintain the assumption that countries’ preferences regarding the desired climate out-
come are perfectly aligned. Our work advances this literature by putting heterogeneous
preferences over the global average temperature center-stage. We believe that this source
of asymmetry is crucial to capture the idea of excessive SG, frequently referred to as
’free-driving’.2 Second, we extend Weitzman (2015) and Heyen (2016) in several ways,
most importantly by adding the option of CG. The first paper that has put CG center-
stage is Parker et al. (2018). We advance their analysis by using a richer and calibrated
game-theoretical model (also see Appendix C on the timing of the non-cooperative game)
and by studying incentives for cooperation. Third, cooperation incentives surrounding
SG have been studied by Millard-Ball (2012) and Ricke et al. (2013). We extend this
literature in two ways: first, we study heterogeneous preferences over the global tem-
perature and show that cooperation incentives crucially depend on the degree to which
countries disagree about the desired climate. Second, we introduce CG and demonstrate
that CG significantly alters countries’ incentives to cooperate.
The second strand of the literature we contribute to is the environmental economics
literature on public goods, externalities and cooperation, see for instance Barrett (1994)
and Finus (2008). Despite the dominant approach of considering symmetric players,
the subtle and important role of heterogeneity in strategic environmental settings has
been noted and emphasized (Barrett 2001; McGinty 2007; Finus and McGinty 2018).
In this context our paper makes three innovations. First, following Weitzman (2015)
and Heyen (2016) we allow for the over-provision of a public good by modelling non-
monotonic benefit functions with heterogeneous optimal levels, a feature not present
in other asymmetric public good settings; in contrast to Weitzman (2015), however,
we include deployment costs, which gives rise to much richer findings, and situate this
discussion in a standard public-good setting with a smooth benefit function. The second
2Emmerling and Tavoni (2017) interpret free-driving as over-provision relative to the cooperative
(global first-best) solution. This is why free-driving in their sense can also occur in settings with sym-





















innovation of our paper is to consider CG, which essentially allows agents to make
‘negative’ contributions to a public good, an aspect that may be of more general interest
in future research beyond geoengineering. Finally, the third contribution of our paper to
the environmental economics literature on public goods and cooperation is to introduce a
moratorium treaty, i.e. we give agents the option to jointly abstain from contributions to
the public good altogether. This form of cooperation, which has not received attention
in the literature – unsurprising in light of the focus on symmetric settings – may be
of general interest for the analysis of strategic interaction of agents with asymmetric
preferences, in particular when side-payments are not available.
We proceed as follows. Sec. 2 presents the model components in detail, with a focus
on the case of two countries. Sec. 3 analyzes the deployment stage, in particular the
non-cooperative outcomes both with and without CG; these non-cooperative outcomes
are the reference points for countries when choosing whether to cooperate, discussed
in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 calibrates the model. We then present two robustness checks: Sec.
6 relaxes the assumption that SG and CG have the same cost structure and Sec. 7
generalizes from two to n countries. Sec. 8 concludes.
2 The Model
In our model two countries with asymmetric preferences decide on climate intervention
levels, i.e. changes to global temperatures using either SG or CG. Initially we assume
SG and CG are symmetric in terms of costs, but we relax that assumption in section 6.
The general case with n countries is covered in section 7. Because changes to global tem-
peratures affect every country, we model climate intervention as a public good provision
game.
2.1 Timing of Events
In the first stage the two countries can cooperate by forming a climate intervention
treaty. The two available options are a moratorium treaty, in which the countries commit
themselves to deploy neither SG nor CG, and a deployment treaty, in which the countries
within the coalition commit themselves to choose technology levels so as to maximize the
coalition’s sum of payoffs. By definition, the deployment treaty implements the climate
intervention that maximizes global welfare. If neither treaty comes into effect, countries
in the second period choose their climate intervention levels simultaneously and non-
cooperatively.3 In order to assess the game-changing potential of CG we contrast two
cases. First, the ‘SG only’ case when CG is not available and hence climate interventions
are restricted to cooling. We then compare this with the ‘CG available’ case in which
3We consider the simultaneous game structure to be the most realistic representation of non-
cooperative interaction on climate intervention and therefore deviate from the sequential order in Parker





















countries have the option to increase or decrease global mean temperatures. The non-
cooperative outcome depends on whether CG is available or not, and this will in turn
have implications for the attractiveness of the treaties.
2.2 Definitions and Assumptions
Climate intervention levels gi ∈ R, i = A,B, are measured in terms of the resulting
temperature change. The global average temperature under climate change T0 – the
status quo temperature countries face when making their climate intervention choice –
is normalized to zero, T0 = 0.
4 Hence, the change in global average temperature T due
to climate intervention is
T = gA + gB. (1)
We assume that costs and benefits are quadratic (Barrett 1994; McGinty 2007; Finus




g2i , i = A,B (2)
with c > 0.6 We assume for simplicity that SG and CG have the same country-
independent cost structure. The general case with asymmetric cost structures for SG
and CG is covered in Section 6. The climate benefits are
Bi(T ) = −
b
2
(Ti − T )2 , i = A,B (3)
with b > 0.7 We define the benefit-cost parameter θ = b/c. In contrast to operational
costs which are private, the benefit function B reflects the public good nature of the
climate intervention: Benefits depend on the global average temperature T and hence
on the climate intervention levels of both countries. The benefits are highest at T = Ti
which justifies calling Ti country i’s preferred temperature. For a country that suffers
from climate change, which is the typical situation, Ti < 0.
4This temperature includes the effects of any previous mitigation efforts. We do not model mitigation
explicitly. The reason is that we are interested in the strategic interaction surrounding SG and CG
that can be expected to unfold on a fairly short timescale: climate interventions would have an almost
immediate temperature response effect, whereas the effects of mitigation need much longer to materialize.
5The calibration in Sec. 5 justifies this assumption.
6For the analysis within a public good framework it is crucial to focus on those costs that are borne by
each country individually. In the context of a climate intervention these are the direct operational costs
of modifying the global climate. Indirect costs that are climate-related are captured within the non-
monotonic benefit function B. Indirect costs not related to climate indicators, e.g. health impacts from
sulfur particles, are not incorporated in our simple model; including them would likely only strengthen
our results as they add another source of external effects, see the discussion in section 8. The cost
function (2) captures that the deployment costs a country has to bear are convex in that country’s level
of geoengineering deployment but is not able to capture that deployment costs may also be affected by
deployment by others.
7Here we make the simplifying assumption that countries assess climate outcomes using temperature
as a proxy for all indicators of climate change. Of course, these simplification comes with limitations





















Country i’s payoff under the climate intervention profile g = (gi)i=A,B is
πi(g) = Bi(T )− C(gi) . (4)
A central component of the model is to allow for different Ti and hence heterogeneous
preferences over the optimal amount of climate intervention.8 Without loss of generality
let TA ≤ TB. Accordingly, from now on A is the country that favours relatively strong
deployment of SG, whereas country B prefers moderate cooling or no cooling at all. We
define the mean optimal temperature change T̄ = TA+TB2 and write




We refer to ∆ as the asymmetry parameter which equals the standard deviation of the
optimal temperature changes TA and TB. For ∆ = 0, both countries agree on how much
the climate ought to change; the higher ∆, the higher the disagreement between the two
countries in terms of how to set the global thermostat.9 One of the advantages of this
definition of ∆ is that it can easily be extended to the general n country case that we
discuss in section 7.
Regarding the overall desirability of some amount of SG, we assume that at the time
countries consider a climate intervention through SG (or CG), past efforts at mitigation
and ’negative emissions’ such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)
have proved insufficient to curb temperatures.
Assumption 1. The world without any climate intervention is on average too warm,
T̄ < 0.
In particular, TA < 0. We do not impose assumptions on TB, so country B might
prefer a warmer climate, TB > 0.
2.3 The Decision to Enter a Treaty
We model a climate intervention treaty in line with the literature on international envi-
ronmental agreements (e.g. Barrett 1994, 2001; Finus 2008). Instead of joint decisions
8It is worth emphasizing that our model’s approach to capture heterogeneity in terms of different
optimal levels of a public good is novel. With the exception of Weitzman (2015) and Heyen (2016), the
typical focus in the literature has been to assume the same optimal level of the public good but different
slopes of the marginal benefit function (e.g. McGinty 2007).
9A simple illustrative example provides evidence that countries may prefer different global average
temperatures. Assume country A and country B to have pre-industrial temperatures of 16◦C and 10◦C,
respectively. Further assume that climate change increases temperatures in both countries by 3◦C. The
climate impact literature suggests that growth rates are maximal for a certain universal, i.e. country-
independent, temperature; Burke et al. (2015) find growth rates to follow a quadratic inverted U shape
with a maximum at around 13◦C. If country A and country B both regard 13◦C as their optimal
temperature, then we have in our notation TA = −6
◦C and TB = 0
◦C, resulting in ∆ = 3◦C. Such a
universal optimal temperature, even if countries’ preferences are only partially determined by it, provides






















on emission abatement levels, countries in a coalition here jointly decide on climate in-
tervention levels. In the first type of treaty, the deployment treaty, countries choose
the amount of SG that maximizes the coalition’s total payoff, i.e. the sum of payoffs
across its members. One of the innovations of our paper is to allow for a second type
of treaty, the moratorium treaty. Here, the countries commit themselves to abstain
from climate interventions altogether, gi = 0. One reason to consider this additional
type of treaty is the importance of a moratorium in the geoengineering debate (Victor
2008; Parker 2014); furthermore, the aspect of winners and losers is particularly pro-
nounced in the present paper and a moratorium treaty – by definition less appealing
than a deployment treaty in terms of the sum of payoffs – might possibly be attractive
due to its distributional implications.
In this context it is important to note that we do not include side payments (also
known as transfers) in our model. The importance of side payments in increasing the at-
tractiveness of cooperation has often been noted, especially for countries with asymmet-
ric preferences (McGinty 2007; Barrett 2001).10 Yet we often observe that international
treaties designed to overcome domestic interests face strong opposition and that side
payments in particular are often seen as politically unacceptable (Gampfer et al. 2014;
Diederich and Goeschl 2017). This suggests that studying incentives for cooperation
that do not rely on transfers is an important benchmark. The deployment treaty and
moratorium treaty are two specific, yet salient, forms of cooperation in the absence of
transfers.
As usual in the literature on international environmental agreements we define a
treaty to be stable if it is a Nash equilibrium in membership strategies. With only
two countries this condition reduces to determining whether both countries prefer the
treaty in question over the non-cooperative outcome (for the general case see section 7).
Because the non-cooperative outcome depends on whether CG is available or not, the
stability of a treaty also depends on the availability of CG.11 We determine stability of the
two possible treaties, moratorium treaty and deployment treaty, separately. Therefore
it may happen that both treaties are stable. While equilibrium selection is not a focus
of our paper, we aim to make the analysis in the n = 2 case as easy to follow as possible
and hence make the following tie-breaking assumption.
Assumption 2 (Tie-breaking rule). If both treaties are stable, i.e. if both countries are
willing to enter either of the two treaties, then the one most preferred by both countries
comes into effect if there is such a clear ordering; if countries disagree on the preferred
order, we assume that the moratorium treaty comes into effect.
10Indeed, in the absence of negotiation and transaction costs, it is well known that transfer schemes
exist to ensure that the socially optimal configuration makes each party better off (Coase 1960).
11Furthermore, with only two countries it does not make a difference whether the coalition is modelled
as an open membership game, in which a country can enter a coalition without the other members’
invitation, or an exclusive club, where access to a coalition is conditional on the members’ consent (Ricke





















The rationale for this tie-breaking rule is that the status quo of non-deployment may
be a focal point, for instance because an error of geoengineering ’commission’ is assumed
to be worse than an error of geoengineering ’omission’ (Weitzman 2015). We will see
below that equilibrium selection has a significant impact on the analysis.
We proceed with the equilibrium analysis. We first discuss the non-cooperative
equilibria, the fallback option when none of the treaties comes into effect. The relative
attractiveness of the non-cooperative case, in turn, determines countries’ willingness to
enter the moratorium and/or deployment treaty.
3 Optimal Deployment and Non-cooperative Equilibria
We solve the equilibrium via backward induction and thus begin our description with
the climate intervention deployment stage. The countries simultaneously choose gi ∈ R,
i = A,B. In the ‘SG only’ case, deployment is restricted to cooling, gi ≤ 0. When CG
is available, any temperature level gi ∈ R is feasible.12
3.1 Global Optimum
We denote by (g∗∗i )i=A,B the socially optimal configuration that maximizes global welfare




T̄ , i = A,B . (6)
It is efficient that both countries deploy the same amount of solar geoengineering due to
the homogeneous cost structure. Owing to T̄ < 0 (Assumption 1), the socially optimal
deployment scheme features SG deployment by both countries. Whether CG is available
or not has, therefore, no implications for the socially optimal deployment profile. It is
straightforward to see that (6) increases in the benefit-cost ratio θ.
3.2 Non-cooperative equilibria
The first step in determining the non-cooperative Nash equilibria is to calculate the
best response functions. The conceptually simplest case is when CG is available and
hence gi ∈ R unrestricted. In this case, the best response of country i to the other
country’s climate intervention level g−i is characterized by the first-order condition
dπi(gi; g−i)/dgi = 0. In the ‘SG only’ case, we also need to check whether the non-
12The absence of an upper limit on the level of CG corresponds to ’countervailing’ CG (Parker et al.
2018), e.g. the release of a potent GHG. The maximal amount of ’neutralizing’ CG, in contrast, would be
a function of the deployed SG level. We find that CG levels are smaller than SG levels, see below, so that


































θ+1 (Ti − g−i) CG available
(7)
Figure 1 shows how the best response functions depend on the asymmetry ∆.
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(a) ∆ = 0 ◦C
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(b) ∆ = 0.4 ◦C
g
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(c) ∆ = 0.8 ◦C
Figure 1: Best response functions (country A in red, country B in blue) for different asymmetry
levels ∆. In all plots θ = 2 and T̄ = −2 ◦C. The solid lines and dashed lines show the best
response functions in the ’SG only’ and ’CG available’ case, respectively. The unfilled circle
indicates the socially optimal benchmark (g∗∗A , g
∗∗
B ). The asymmetry threshold is ∆̄ = 0.4
◦C, see
(8). For ∆ > ∆̄ the equilibrium outcome, indicated by a filled black circle, depends on whether
CG is available or not.
We now summarize non-cooperative equilibria in the ‘SG only’ and ‘CG available’
scenarios and hence determine the game-changing effect of CG in the absence of coop-





The asymmetry threshold plays an important role in the following discussion, as it helps
explain which equilibria obtain under different conditions.
Proposition 1 (Game-changing potential of CG. Non-cooperative equilibria). There is
a unique Nash equilibrium and the outcome depends on parameter settings and whether
CG is available:
(i) The ‘SG only’ case. For low levels of asymmetry, ∆ < ∆̄, both countries engage




T̄ − θ∆ < 0 , g∗B =
θ
2θ + 1
T̄ + θ∆ < 0 . (9)



























B = 0 . (10)
(ii) The ‘CG available’ case. For low levels of asymmetry, ∆ < ∆̄, there is no incentive
to deploy CG. The unique equilibrium is therefore the free-rider outcome (9).
For high levels of asymmetry, ∆ ≥ ∆̄, country A cools and, simultanouesly, country




T̄ − θ∆ < 0 , g∗B =
θ
2θ + 1
T̄ + θ∆ ≥ 0 .13 (11)
(iii) For a fixed ∆ ≥ ∆̄, switching from the ’SG only’ to the ’CG available’ case is




Total welfare is unambiguously reduced.
Proof. See appendix A.
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Figure 2: Climate intervention levels of the non-cooperative equilibria as a function of the asym-
metry ∆. The parameter settings are as in Figure 1, i.e. θ = 2 and T̄ = −2 ◦C. The vertical line
is at the asymmetry threshold ∆̄. The dashed and dot-dashed lines represent the deployment
by country A and country B, respectively, while the solid lines show total levels. For compari-
son we include the total climate intervention levels under the moratorium treaty (zero) and the
deployment treaty (the total level is twice the amount in (6)).
13Note that for T̄ = 0 the climate clash would involve opposite climate interventions by country A
and B, g∗A = −g
∗
B , with g
∗ = g∗A + g
∗
B = 0, and that deployment treaty and moratorium treaty would





















Figure 2 shows climate intervention levels for both countries under the non-cooperative
equilibria as a function of the asymmetry level ∆. For comparison we include the total
SG level under the moratorium treaty (i.e. zero) and the deployment treaty. The free-
driver SG level (solid purple line) depends on country A’s optimal temperature change
TA but not on TB and hence the cooling intensifies as the asymmetry level ∆ increases.
The total temperature change in the climate clash (solid red line) matches the free-rider
level (solid orange line) and is independent of the asymmetry level ∆, but is the result
of ever diverging SG and CG levels (dashed and dot-dashed red lines) by country A and
country B respectively.14
The free-rider equilibrium is a well-known outcome in the literature; in particular,
the symmetric case ∆ = 0 is of this type. The more interesting outcome in the ‘SG
only’ case is the free-driver equilibrium. The terminology is from Weitzman (2015) who
develops the concept of over-provision of a public good in a setting without deployment
costs and with a specific kinked utility function. Our definition coincides with the one in
Heyen (2016). The defining characteristic of the free-driver equilibrium is that cooling is
excessive from country B’s perspective, T ≤ TB, and country A is essentially in control
of the global thermostat. This excessive cooling does not necessarily imply that country
B is worse off relative to a world without any climate intervention. Importantly for our
analysis, there is no free-driver equilibrium anymore once CG is available. Country B
now has a tool to counter the over-provision of the public good, and due to zero marginal
costs (at the point of non-deployment), country B uses this tool. The best response of
country A, in turn, is to increase its SG efforts. The only reason why SG and CG levels
are bounded in this escalation equilibrium is the convexity of the cost function.
This section has demonstrated that without the possibility of cooperation, CG trans-
forms a free-driver outcome into a climate clash, i.e. those parameter constellations that
led to a free-driver equilibrium in the ’SG only’ case now lead to a climate clash equi-
librium when CG is available. This transformation is overall detrimental as countries
waste significant resources on SG and CG. But can CG play a more positive role in the
context of cooperation? The next section is dedicated to this question.
4 Incentives for Cooperation
This section analyzes the incentives to cooperate on climate intervention via either a
deployment treaty or a moratorium treaty. We begin with the ‘SG only’ case in section
4.1 and cover the ‘CG available’ case in section 4.2. All findings are illustrated in
Figure 3.
14The total deployment level in the climate clash is independent of the level of asymmetry if and only





















4.1 Cooperation incentives when only SG is available
The non-cooperative deployment equilibria derived in the previous section (cf. Propo-
sition 1) are the appropriate reference points when countries are deciding whether they
are willing to cooperate by entering a moratorium or deployment treaty. We start with
the low asymmetry case where non-cooperation would result in the free-rider outcome.
Proposition 2 (Cooperation incentives in the ‘SG only’ case. Low asymmetry, ∆ < ∆̄).
Country A prefers the deployment treaty over the free-rider equilibrium irrespective of the
level of asymmetry ∆. There is however a value ∆FreeRiderMax ∈ [0, ∆̄] such that country B
prefers the deployment treaty only when 0 ≤ ∆ < ∆FreeRiderMax , which is therefore the region
where the deployment treaty comes into effect. Both countries prefer the non-cooperative
free-rider equilibrium to the moratorium treaty.
Proof. The algebraic expression for ∆FreeRiderMax and derivations are in Appendix A.
That neither country finds the moratorium treaty attractive is intuitive as both
countries engage in SG in the non-cooperative equilibrium, indicating that they find SG
valuable even under these non-cooperative conditions; to completely abstain from SG
in a moratorium treaty then must be unattractive. The reason why country A prefers
the deployment treaty to the non-cooperative free-rider outcome is cost-sharing. The
disadvantage from having to compromise with country B on SG deployment levels is,
due to the relatively aligned preferences in low asymmetry settings, small compared to
the gain from splitting deployment costs. Country B opposes the deployment treaty
for asymmetry levels above ∆FreeRiderMax since the final temperature outcome in the non-
cooperative free-rider equilibrium is close to country B’s optimal level TB (matching this
level exactly at ∆ = ∆̄) and country A shoulders the main part of deployment cost. In
other words, country B is free-riding on country A’s SG deployment. We will see below
that country B’s opposition to the deployment treaty also extends into the free-driver
and climate clash region.
We move on to the case of high asymmetry, where the non-cooperative outcome
would be the free-driver equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Cooperation incentives in the ‘SG only’ case. High asymmetry, ∆ ≥ ∆̄).




Morat, all of them larger than ∆̄, such that:
(i) Country A prefers the free-driver equilibrium to the moratorium treaty throughout
and prefers the deployment treaty over the free-driver equilibrium if ∆ < ∆SGMax.
(ii) Country B opts for the moratorium treaty when ∆ > ∆SGMorat and prefers the deploy-





Therefore, the deployment treaty is stable for ∆SGMin < ∆ < ∆
SG
Max, whereas the morato-





















Proof. The algebraic expressions for all relevant levels of the asymmetry parameter ∆
and other derivations are in Appendix A.
Here we see for the first time the appeal of a world without any climate intervention.
Country B is willing to enter the moratorium treaty if the disadvantage from being dom-
inated by the free-driver is sufficiently high. However, it is intuitive that the moratorium
is not appealing to country A, the free-driver. Therefore, there are no circumstances un-
der which the moratorium treaty can be expected to materialize. The deployment treaty
has better chances to form. If the asymmetry exceeds ∆SGMin, the free-driver outcome is
too harmful for country B which is hence willing to enter the deployment treaty.15 Coun-
try A is also willing to enter the deployment treaty, yet under almost inverse conditions.
Specifically, for relatively moderate asymmetry levels, ∆ < ∆SGMax, the sharing of deploy-
ment costs is attractive enough to justify the compromise in temperature levels. For
asymmetry levels higher than ∆SGMax, however, the gap between the temperature com-
promise implicit in the deployment treaty and what country A would like to implement
is too wide. But ∆SGMin < ∆
SG
Max, and so there do exist constellations where countries,
faced with a looming free-driver outcome, decide to cooperate.
4.2 Cooperation incentives with CG
If asymmetry is low, ∆ ≤ ∆̄, cooperation incentives are not changed by the availability
of CG as countries have no incentives to deploy CG anyway. We hence focus on the
high-asymmetry case where non-cooperation would result in the climate clash.
Proposition 4 (Cooperation incentives in the ‘CG available’ case. High asymmetry,




Morat, all of them larger than ∆̄, and
the positive value ∆BMorat,Treaty such that:
(i) Country A unambiguously prefers the deployment treaty over both the climate clash
and the moratorium treaty, and prefers the moratorium over the climate clash iff
∆ > ∆CG,AMorat.
(ii) Country B prefers the deployment treaty over the climate clash iff ∆ > ∆CGMin > ∆̄,
prefers the moratorium over the climate clash iff ∆ > ∆CG,BMorat, and prefers the mora-





the size of ∆BMorat,Treaty relative to other critical levels depends on parameter set-
tings.
Therefore, the deployment treaty is stable for ∆ > ∆CGMin and the moratorium treaty is
stable for ∆ > ∆CG,AMorat. Under the tie-breaking Assumption 2, the separating level between





15The intuition why country B still prefers the free-driver outcome over the deployment treaty for
moderate asymmetry levels, ∆ < ∆SGMin, is the same as in Proposition 2: The free-driver equilibrium
involves no deployment costs for country B, and final temperature changes T , while excessive, are still
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of welfare levels and equilibria as a function of the asymmetry
parameter ∆. The upper part shows the ‘SG only’ case, the lower part the ‘CG available’ case.
The welfare plots are illustrative only. The solid and dashed lines represent country A and B,
respectively. The red curves represent all non-cooperative outcomes and are given, depending
on asymmetry level ∆ and whether CG is available or not, by expressions (9), (10) or (11).
The boxes above the equilibrium labels indicate whether countries A and B are willing to join
either of the two treaties (dark fill) or not (light fill), respectively. A hatched fill indicates that a
country’s decision whether to join or not is parameter-dependent but inconsequential for the final
outcome. When both treaties are stable (i.e. both treaties are attractive for both countries) and
countries disagree about which of the two they prefer, then our tie-breaking rule in Assumption
2 resolves the disagreement. Note that the relative size of the treaty equilibria with and without
CG depends on parameter values. See section 5 for a calibration and sensitivity analysis.
Proof. See appendix A.





















clash, once the asymmetry exceeds ∆CG,AMorat. The interest in the moratorium underlines
how unattractive the climate clash is. Country B is more interested in the moratorium
treaty than country A, which is expressed both by a wider opt-in region (∆CG,BMorat <
∆CG,AMorat) and by a preference for the moratorium over the deployment treaty for levels
beyond ∆BMorat,Treaty (a preference that country A never has). This is intuitive when
we recall that temperatures under climate change absent any climate intervention (the
outcome under the moratorium treaty) are relatively less harmful for country B than
for country A. There is a simple intuition why country A is keen to cooperate via the
deployment treaty. Not only are deployment costs in the cooperative solution much lower
than in the climate clash, the social optimal SG deployment level is also more ambitious
and thus closer to TA. That country B prefers the deployment treaty to the climate clash
for moderate asymmetry levels ∆ is similar to before: country B’s deployment costs are
low and the final temperature change is relatively close to B’s optimum TB.
To summarize, we find a rich set of potential outcomes that are depicted in Figure 3.
Every outcome (the three non-cooperative as well as the two treaties) materializes under
certain conditions, and the boundaries that separate different outcomes are non-trivial.
A parameter calibration and sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium boundaries are pre-
sented in Section 5. Our findings suggest a substantial potential of CG to change the
statics of the global thermostat game: The basic mechanism is CG transforms the game
such that the outcome changes from a free-driver in the ’SG only’ case to a ’climate clash’
when CG is available. This transformation of outcomes is always bad for the free-driver
A (and often for country B as well). It is this mechanism that brings the free-driver to
the negotiating table when cooperation is possible: the free-driver is now always willing
to enter the global optimal deployment treaty. In order to prevent the wasteful climate
clash, the free-driver is, under certain conditions, even willing to accept the otherwise
very unattractive conditions of a moratorium treaty. We will show in section 7 that this
basic mechanism also shapes the general n country case.
4.3 Welfare ranking of outcomes
We have now gained a comprehensive understanding of CG’s potential to change the
global thermostat game. Are the changes induced by CG for the better or worse? We
have partially answered this question above. Proposition 1 shows that, in terms of
non-cooperative outcomes, the transformation from free-driver outcome to climate clash
induced by CG is detrimental as it decreases global welfare. On the other hand, whenever
this bleak outlook induces countries to form a deployment treaty, which by definition
implements the global best, then CG’s game-changing effect is beneficial. What remains
to be understood is how the moratorium treaty ranks in welfare terms. The following
result shows that the moratorium, cf. Proposition 4, is only better than the free-driver





















treaty to the climate clash. While not important for the welfare impact induced by the
presence of CG, this result sheds light on the value of having cooperation options once
CG is part of the game.
Proposition 5 (Welfare of Moratorium Treaty).
(i) Global welfare under the moratorium treaty is higher than in the free-driver equi-
librium iff ∆ > ∆WelfareMorat,Driver, where ∆
Welfare
Morat,Driver > ∆̄
(ii) Global welfare under the moratorium treaty is higher than in the climate clash equi-
librium iff ∆ > ∆WelfareMorat,Clash, where ∆
Welfare




Proof. See appendix A.
5 Calibration, sensitivity analysis, and welfare impact
In this section we first calibrate the model parameters b, c and T̄ . We then determine
the sensitivity of equilibrium boundaries to changes in parameters. Finally, we discuss
the welfare effect of CG in the calibrated model.
5.1 Parameter calibration
Our calibration of the benefit parameter b rests on Burke et al. (2015) who show that the
relationship between (local) temperatures and growth rates follows a universal quadratic
relationship. The calibration of the cost parameter c is based on data on stratospheric
SG with sulfur aerosols. It combines data on operational cost per kg of load material with
the non-linear relation between sulfur load and reduction in radiative forcing. Finally,
T̄ expresses the amount of atmospheric cooling required to achieve the global optimal
temperature at the point of climate intervention. This clearly depends on emissions
scenarios. Appendix B provides details on the calibration that results in the following
parameter values
b = 17.95 bn $/◦C2 , c = 8.35 bn $/◦C2 , T̄ = −2.1◦C. (12)
We keep asymmetry ∆ as an open parameter for two reasons. First, this parameter
is the hardest to calibrate as it depends on regional/country-specific preferences over
climate outcomes (in contrast to T̄ which is a measure of globally aggregated preferences).
Second, this provides us with a degree of freedom to describe a variety of interactions





















5.2 Outcome boundaries and sensitivity
What outcome can we expect under parameters calibrated as above, and how sensi-
tive are the equilibrium boundaries in Figure 3 to parameter settings? Analysis of the
algebraic expression of the equilibrium boundaries (see appendix A) reveals that all
boundaries scale linearly with T̄ and depend only on the benefit-cost ratio θ = b/c, not
b and c separately. The horizontal line in Figure 4 shows the equilibrium boundaries for
the best estimate of θ, b/c = 17.95/8.35, cf. (12). We check for sensitivity by scaling
the benefit-cost ratio upwards and downwards by two orders of magnitude. Figure 4a
and 4b depict the ‘SG only’ and ‘CG available’ cases, respectively. The solid black line
represents ∆̄, the asymmetry threshold from (8) that separates free-rider outcomes to
the left from free-driver (‘SG only’) and climate clash (‘CG available’) outcomes to the
right.
The first observation is that the asymmetry threshold ∆̄ is fairly small for the cal-
ibrated parameter values.16 This means that, in the absence of CG, even a small dis-
agreement over the best use of SG will result in the free-driver outcome. Also note
that the deployment treaty is plausible only for the asymmetry range between 1 ◦C and
2 ◦C. Overall, the free-driver equilibrium is the most likely outcome in the ‘SG only’
case. We see that, under the calibrated parameter values, CG slightly reduces the set
of constellations under which the deployment treaty materializes, whereas the climate
clash is the predicted outcome only for a relatively narrow range of asymmetry values.
The moratorium treaty, according to our tie-breaking assumption 2, is the predicted
outcome for the ‘CG available’ case for higher values of the asymmetry parameter.
In terms of sensitivity to parameter changes, we have noted above that all boundaries
scale linearly with T̄ . Thus we can focus on the effect of changes in the benefit-cost
ratio θ = b/c. Figure 4 demonstrates that all our observations from above are only
strengthened if θ gets higher, for instance if operational costs of a climate intervention
were significantly lower than current estimates. The free-driver is the typical outcome
in the ‘SG only’ case, and cooperation (through either a deployment or moratorium
treaty) in the ‘CG available’ case almost certain. The outcomes are very different if
we consider lower benefit-cost ratios, for instance because climate damages are seen as
relatively minor and/or climate interventions much more costly than currently expected.
Then, the free-rider outcome becomes much more plausible, in which case the presence
of CG would be inconsequential. Interestingly, the likelihood of cooperation (via either
16What are large and small values of the asymmetry parameter ∆? Consider the example sketched
in footnote 9 where country A and country B have pre-industrial average temperatures of 16◦C and
10◦C, respectively (this is not an extreme scenario as multiple regions experienced pre-industrial average
temperatures beyond 20◦C). If both countries determined their preferences over climate interventions
based solely on a universal optimal temperature, e.g. the 13◦C in Burke et al. (2015), then ∆ = 3K.
If, less extreme, both countries considered the midpoint between pre-industrial and a certain universal
temperature as optimal, then ∆ = 1.5K. In this sense it is justified to say that the asymmetry threshold























Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium boundaries in the n = 2 case. The reference
benefit-cost ratio θ = b/c = 17.95/8.35, cf. (12), is represented as the horizontal line. To check
sensitivity we scale θ upwards and downwards by two orders of magnitude. The solid black curve
in both plots represents ∆̄. The dashed lines in (b) represent the deployment treaty boundaries
of the ‘SG only’ case in (a).
deployment or moratorium treaty) decreases as θ decreases, and the climate clash for





















5.3 Calibrated welfare impacts
In this section we give a calibrated answer to the question whether the game-changing
potential of CG is beneficial or detrimental. Figure 5 shows the effect of CG on global
welfare.17 As in Figure 4, the horizontal axis shows the asymmetry between country
A and country B, whereas the vertical axis shows a range of benefit-cost ratios; the
horizontal line represents the best estimate of θ = b/c in (12).
There are two regions where CG does not change the outcome of the game and hence
leaves global welfare unchanged (indicated by white coloring). First, all asymmetry levels
to the left of the asymmetry threshold ∆̄. Here, the non-cooperative outcome is the free-
rider equilibrium, and neither country wants to deploy CG in the first place. The second
region is where the deployment treaty was the outcome in the ‘SG case’ and remains the
outcome when CG is available.
We find two reasons why CG can be beneficial, indicated by green colors in Figure
5. First, CG can transform a free-driver outcome into a deployment treaty, and our
findings suggest that this is likely for intermediate levels of asymmetry and relatively
high benefit-cost ratios. The second situation in which CG increases overall welfare is
when an extreme free-driver outcome is transformed into a moratorium treaty; in order
for the technology-free world to be globally preferable, the asymmetry level must be high
so that the free-driver outcome is very problematic.
If the asymmetry is not extreme, however, this transformation from free-driver to
moratorium is detrimental (potentially for both countries), represented here in dark red
colors. A second (as it turns out relatively rare) scenario in which CG is detrimental
is when a deployment treaty (bordered by the dashed lines) in the ‘SG only’ case is
transformed into either a climate clash or a moratorium treaty outcome. Finally, there
is a third and important situation in which CG can reduce global welfare: If neither
form of cooperation is attractive, then CG transforms what used to be a bad free-driver
outcome into an even worse climate clash. This scenario is especially plausible for low
benefit-cost ratios.
Appendix D demonstrates that the country-specific effects of CG are fairly clear:
typically country A is worse off under CG, whereas country B benefits from the avail-
ability of CG. The mixed picture that we see in Figure 5 is hence the superposition of
generally contrasting country-specific effects.
17The plotted quantity in the contour plot is the welfare difference between the ‘CG available’ and
the ‘SG only’ case. This difference is, for each separate parameter setting, expressed in terms of the
absolute welfare under the social optimal outcome; if, for instance, global welfare under the deployment
treaty is −10 units (recall that welfare levels are non-positive by assumption), then a value of −50%
in the contour plot means that CG reduces global welfare by 5 units. Note that this plot necessitates
reducing one degree of freedom. While the equilibrium boundaries in Figure 4 depend only on the
benefit-cost ratio θ = b/c, any welfare analysis depends on both parameters b and c separately. There
are different ways to reduce one degree of freedom; here we stipulate that the welfare under the social
optimal deployment profile (g∗∗A , g
∗∗






















Figure 5: Welfare effect of CG. For every pair of ∆ and b/c, the quantity plotted in the contour
plot is the difference in welfare with and without CG, normalized by the social optimal welfare
(i.e. welfare of the deployment treaty). Green and red colors indicate settings where the impact
of CG is positive and negative, respectively, whereas white indicates that CG has no effect on
global welfare.
6 Asymmetric costs
This section introduces the possibility that CG has a different cost structure than SG,













i gi > 0.
(13)
To facilitate comparisons with the previous analysis we write
cSG = c , cCG = ξ · c (14)
with ξ > 0 as a measure of the asymmetry between SG costs and CG costs. The
higher ξ, the costlier is CG relative to SG. The symmetric cost structure studied above
is represented by ξ = 1. As above, we denote the benefit-cost ratio by θ = b/c; the
benefit-cost ratio for CG deployment is θ/ξ.
18This cost structure applies to both countries, i = A,B. Another extension could be to let different





















The clash equilibrium is the only one that involves CG. Therefore, all other equilibria
remain as before, both in terms of deployment and welfare. With the same methodology




θ + (1 + θ)ξ
·
[




θ + (1 + θ)ξ
·
[
T̄ + (2θ + 1)∆
]
. (15)
Expression (11) is the special case of (15) when ξ = 1. As before we look at the
asymmetry level ∆̄ that separates the climate clash equilibrium from the free rider
equilibrium, defined by g∗B = 0. From (15) we see that this level is still ∆̄ = −
T̄
2θ+1
and therefore in particular not a function of ξ. The total deployment level g∗ in the
generalized climate clash equilibrium is
g∗ =
θ
θ + (1 + θ)ξ
·
[
(ξ + 1)T̄ + (1− ξ)∆
]
. (16)
The deployment levels in the generalized climate clash equilibrium show an intuitive
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Due to ∆ ≥ ∆̄, the first expression is positive and the second negative. The higher the
CG cost, the less CG country B deploys; this implies that country A needs to do less










The higher the costs of CG, the more cooling we see in the generalized climate clash
equilibrium.
We also immediately observe an intuitive relation between asymmetry ∆ and the
total temperature change in the generalized climate clash equilibrium. Looking at (16),
we see that an increase in asymmetry ∆ leads to more cooling if CG is costlier than SG,
ξ > 1 and to less cooling if CG is cheaper than SG, ξ < 1. The insensitivity of the total
deployment level g∗ that we observed in section 3.2, cf. Figure 2, occurs if and only if
CG and SG have the same cost structure, ξ = 1.
We now turn to the question how the relative cost structure between SG and CG
changes the statics of the game. The ’SG only’ case is not affected by a change in CG
cost. Figure 4a therefore still describes the set of equilibria without CG, irrespective of
ξ. What is affected by a change in relative costs are the equilibria in the presence of
CG. Figure 6 shows equilibria in the ’CG available’ case (i.e. variations of Figure 4b)





















5) if CG is cheaper than SG, ξ < 1. Figure 7 shows the case when CG is more expensive
than SG, ξ > 1.
We can derive several insights from these figures. First, the climate clash materializes
under wider conditions both for very small as well as very large values of ξ; asymmetry
in costs of SG and CG favors the climate clash equilibrium. Second, the deployment
treaty has the best prospect when CG is costlier than SG and the difference is not too
extreme, say when ξ is around 5. Third, the moratorium treaty has the best prospect
when CG is cheaper than SG and the difference is not extreme, say ξ around 1/5. The
moratorium treaty disappears from the scene of possible outcomes when CG gets very
costly relative to SG. Fourth, as CG gets infinitely more costly than SG, the equilibria
map converges to the ’SG only’ shape, where the free driver equilibrium replaces the
climate clash. This makes sense: a very costly CG is similar to no CG at all. Finally,
the welfare effect is not straightforward. The simple intuition ’costly CG is similar to
no CG’ works for low theta values: the CG level deployed by country B here is very low,
the free driver accordingly does not have to adjust his level much. The welfare change
caused by CG accordingly is small, indicated by white/light red areas for low values
of θ in Figure 7. The intuition however is less straightforward for high values of the
benefit-cost ratio θ. While the statics of the game determining the equilibrium outcome
are still compatible with the ’costly CG is similar to no CG in the first place’ logic,
the welfare change is significant. The reason seems to be that high benefit-cost ratios θ
cause a major CG deployment and accordingly a major adjustment in the free-driver’s
behavior. But this requires additional research.
(a) ξ = 0.01 (b) ξ = 0.05 (c) ξ = 0.2 (d) ξ = 0.5
Figure 6: Asymmetric costs. CG cheaper than SG, ξ < 1.
7 The n countries case
This section extends the setup to the general case of n countries. We derive analytical





















(a) ξ = 2 (b) ξ = 5 (c) ξ = 20 (d) ξ = 100
Figure 7: Asymmetric costs. CG more expensive than SG, ξ > 1.
country model. For simplicity we go back to the assumption that SG and CG have the
same cost structure, i.e. ξ = 1 in this section.
7.1 Model setup
The general structure in terms of benefit function, cost function and timeline of the model
remains as before. There are now n countries, each with climate intervention level gi,
i = 1, . . . , n. The change in global average temperature T due to climate interventions
is T =
∑n




i=1 Ti, where Ti is
country i’s preferred global average temperature change. We keep assumption 1, i.e.
T̄ < 0. We write
Ti = T̄ +∆δi , (19)
where δi ≤ . . . ≤ δn with
∑n






i = 1, so that ∆ is
the standard deviation of the optimal temperature change Ti. We call ∆ as above the
asymmetry parameter. For ∆ = 0, all countries agree on how much the climate ought to
change; increasing ∆ represents growing disagreement across countries. Note that the
definition for n = 2 in section 2 coincides with the definition given here: it is δA = −1
and δB = 1. We denote by (g
∗∗
i )i the socially optimal configuration that maximizes
global welfare
∑n




T̄ , i = 1, . . . , n . (20)
It is efficient for all countries to deploy the same amount of SG due to the homogeneous
cost structure. Owing to T̄ < 0 (Assumption 1), the socially optimal deployment scheme
features SG deployment by all countries. In particular, whether CG is available or not






















As before, the asymmetry ∆ determines how many countries deploy SG in equilibrium,
and the number of countries deploying SG is monotonically decreasing in ∆. The re-
maining countries, in any case, consider the overall temperature reduction by SG as too
high and accordingly either do not deploy SG (in the ‘SG only’ case) or deploy CG (in
the ‘CG available’ case). In the following we use the notation θ = b/c, βm =
mθ
mθ+1
and denote the average optimal temperature change among the first m countries by
T̄ (m) = 1
m
∑m
i=1 Ti. With these preliminaries, we are ready for our next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Non-cooperative equilibria. General n). There is a set of values ∆(m)
(m = 0, . . . , n) that is decreasing in m with ∆(0) = ∞ and ∆(n) = 0. Let the asymmetry
parameter be in the interval ∆ ∈ [∆(m),∆(m−1)].
(i) The ‘SG only’ case has a unique equilibrium where the m countries with the highest
preference for cooling deploy SG
g
(m)
i = θ(Ti − βmT̄
(m)) i = 1, . . .m (21)
and the remaining countries do not deploy, g
(m)
i = 0, i = m+ 1, . . . , n.
(ii) When CG is available, all countries’ deployment levels are given by
g
(n)
i = θ(Ti − βnT̄ ) i = 1, . . . n (22)
where the first m are negative (SG deployment) and the remaining n−m positive
(CG deployment).
(iii) The transformation induced by CG is typically detrimental, but there are exceptions
to this rule.
Proof. See appendix A.
In the case n = 2 we have, as required, ∆(1) = ∆̄ and the quantities given in
Proposition 1 all coincide with (21), evaluated at m = 2 (free-rider and climate clash)
or m = 1 (free-driver).
7.3 Cooperation: assumptions and results
The two forms of treaties, moratorium treaty and deployment treaty, are both modelled
as open-membership games. Under the moratorium treaty all countries bind themselves
to abstain from any technology deployment. For a deployment treaty, we stipulate that
at most one coalition can form, and this coalition decides on the optimal deployment
of SG, where the objective is maximization of the coalition’s total payoff. In terms of





















its decision, the other countries (’fringe’) decide simultaneously and non-cooperatively
on optimal SG (in the ‘SG only’ scenario) or between SG and CG deployment (in the
‘CG available’ scenario). Note that we allow for at most one coalition and assume that
coalitions have at least two members. The reason is simplicity. Furthermore, we rule
out CG as the coalition’s action. The reason is to allow a good comparison of the ‘SG
only’ and ‘CG available’ case. One might defend this assumption by saying that further
warming the climate through CG clearly has less international justification than SG, so
international treaties on CG are less plausible. Nevertheless it would be worthwhile to
explore alternative forms of cooperation in future research.
Stability of coalitions. The moratorium treaty is stable if and only if all countries
prefer the technology-free world over the non-cooperative technology deployment. A
deployment treaty (where the size can range between 2 and n) is stable if it is internally
and externally stable. Internal stability means that every coalition member’s payoff is
higher or the same compared to a scenario in which he leaves the coalition (and the
remaining members still form a coalition). External stability of a coalition means that
no fringe country can improve her outcome by joining the coalition. Both stability
concepts take the decisions of other countries as given. In other words we follow the
usual simplifying approach without farsighted players (Mariotti and Xue 2003).
We find that there are stable coalitions that deploy no SG at all. The reason is our
simplifying assumption that at most one coalition can form, which results in countries
forming non-deploying coalitions in order to prevent coalitions that deploy SG from form-
ing. We regard this as an artifact of our model assumptions and accordingly disregard
non-deploying stable coalitions.
Results. To illustrate the general case, Figure 8 shows the results for a setting with
n = 7 countries (we found similar results for other values of n). We focus on a setting
with a clear ’free-driver’ in the following sense: One country prefers temperatures lower
than T̄ , all others are symmetric and prefer a moderate cooling. The leftmost vertical
line in Figure 8 is at ∆ = 0, the next separates two types of non-cooperative outcomes:
low asymmetry levels where all countries deploy SG (orange), and levels where only the
free-driver deploys SG (purple). The latter outcome is transformed into a climate clash
(red) when CG is available. We show two ranges (of different scales) of the asymmetry
parameter ∆. The first range (left to the double vertical bar) is [0, 1.25], the second
(to the right of the double vertical bar) is the range [1.25, 5]. We show the stability
of moratorium and deployment treaty, the latter differentiated into full cooperation
deployment treaties (all countries are part of the treaty) and partial deployment treaties
(only some countries participate). We find that stable coalitions take the form ’free-driver
+ k others’. For moratorium treaty and full cooperation deployment treaty outcomes,
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Figure 8: Global thermostat game setting for n = 7. One country prefers a strong cooling
whereas the other six are symmetric and prefer a moderate cooling. This implies (cf. 19) that
δ1 = −2.450 and δi = 0.408 for i = 2, . . . , 7. We keep the parameter calibration from above,
cf. (12). The figure presents non-cooperative equilibria and stability of moratorium treaty, full
deployment treaty and partial deployment treaties (here always of the form “free-driver + x
other countries”).
’free-driver’ and for the other countries bundled as ’rest’ (we code ’rest’ as incentivized
to cooperate if all other countries are willing to cooperate); coalitions are stable where
incentives to cooperate overlap.
Our results are in line with the n = 2 findings. The non-cooperative case is perfectly
analogous. For low asymmetry ∆ we get a free-rider outcome (where all countries deploy
SG) that is unaffected by the presence of CG; high levels of asymmetry are character-
ized by a free-driver equilibrium (where only one country deploys), and this free-driver
outcome is transformed into a climate clash when CG is available. The cooperation in-
centives are fairly similar to the n = 2 case. Starting with the moratorium treaty, in the
‘SG only’ case the free-driver is unambiguously opposed to it, while the other countries
prefer the technology-free world if asymmetry (and accordingly the gap between other
countries’ optimal temperatures and what the free-driver implements) is high. Once
CG is available, though, the moratorium treaty becomes attractive; in particular, the
free-driver – even at intermediate levels of asymmetry – is willing to jointly abstain from
deployment in order to prevent the costly climate clash.
Moving on to the deployment treaties (including full and partial cooperation), in
the ‘SG only’ case we find that the deployment treaty can only be stable for low and
intermediate levels of asymmetry; for larger levels the free-driver is not willing to compro-
mise. This is to some extent changed when CG is available. Full cooperation remains





















when the coalition’s deployment level is determined), but the zone where at least partial
cooperation is stable is significantly extended under ‘CG available’.
8 Conclusions
We have studied the strategic interaction over fast-acting climate interventions when
countries disagree on how much to modify the climate. We have modelled this interac-
tion as a public good game in which countries with asymmetric preferences anticipate
the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game and have the option to cooperatively
decide on the level of climate intervention. Our main focus has been technological
capabilities to quickly counter other countries’ (excessive) cooling by means of counter-
geoengineering (CG), and in particular the question how CG alters the statics of the
game and under which circumstances the resulting change in outcomes can prove bene-
ficial.
Our findings are summarized as follows. When climate intervention is restricted to
cooling by means of solar geoengineering (SG), then the typical outcome is the ’free-
driver’ equilibrium. The free-driver, the country that suffers from climate change the
most and hence wants to cool the most, may set global temperatures as it pleases; other
countries may suffer damages from this excessive cooling but have no measure against
it. Cooperation incentives in this case are relatively weak, first and foremost because
the free-driver has little reason to compromise. The availability of CG changes this
game significantly. We demonstrate that the free-driver outcome is not an equilibrium
anymore once dominated countries have CG at their disposal, yet the resulting Nash
equilibrium is an even more harmful ’climate clash’ in which countries waste significant
resources in offsetting SG and CG deployments. This destructive prospect is the very
reason why – under certain circumstances – the existence of CG can significantly increase
countries’ willingness to cooperate. Specifically, the would-be free-driver understands
that a climate clash would harm him substantially, and is hence (under a broad set of
circumstances) willing to make climate intervention decisions cooperatively. This can
enhance collective welfare. Crucially, however, other countries might prefer cooperation
in the form of a moratorium that reduces global welfare, or even a climate clash over
cooperation altogether.
From a policy perspective the central question is what difference does the existence
of a CG capability make to a world where SG is contemplated. Our analysis shows that
the answer depends on three key factors. First, the ratio of benefits and costs of climate
intervention matters. CG tends to increase cooperation incentives for high benefit-cost
ratios but may give rise to a climate clash for low benefit-cost ratios. Second, multiple
cooperative agreements can be stable and it matters which of them materializes. Even
in the simple, stylized n = 2 case, both the moratorium and deployment treaty can be





















key factor for understanding CG’s influence is the level of asymmetry among countries.
Where asymmetry is low, the strategic interaction is essentially a free-rider equilibrium
and CG makes no difference. Where it is intermediate, a climate clash may ensue. For
high levels of asymmetry countries are more willing to cooperate, but our result suggests
that extreme levels of asymmetry may favour a welfare-imperfect moratorium.
Given the novelty both of this topic and of our analytical approach to it, we opted
to keep the modeling framework as simple as possible, and thus we see various oppor-
tunities for extending it. The first possible extension is to allow countries’ preferences
to incorporate and reflect climate indicators beyond temperature. The most obvious
candidate is precipitation, in particular as a major concern surrounding SG is its poten-
tial to alter precipitation patterns. An interesting question in this context is whether
the inclusion of indicators other than temperature exacerbates the asymmetry between
countries or, instead, mitigates the free-driver concern. This points toward linkage with
the emerging literature on ’optimal climate states’. A second possible extension is to
include indirect effects of geoengineering that are not climate-related, for instance the
health effects caused by the particles used for geoengineering (e.g. acid rain and ozone
loss from stratospheric SG with sulfur particles). These effects can be captured with
a second (negative) ’benefit’ function; here, the effects of SG and CG may depend on
the sum of absolute SG and CG levels and thus not cancel out as in the case of climate
related effects. While a thorough analysis is left for future research (building on re-
search into potential SG and CG particles and their possible secondary effects), we can
speculate on how this would change our results. It seems plausible that these additional
external effects would have little effect on individual choices, but render the climate clash
significantly less attractive from a global welfare perspective. In that sense our findings
of a problematic climate clash can be interpreted as a lower bound.
Another possible extension is to generalize the time structure of the non-cooperative
game. The simultaneous global thermostat game in our model proved rich enough for a
variety of equilibria to emerge, but it is worthwhile to study which additional equilibria
emerge in a full dynamic game. Importantly, such an extension would allow for a focus
on uncertainty and learning. The countries in our model have perfect knowledge of how
climate interventions work and how much they cost. It would be interesting to study
how uncertainty changes equilibria and welfare, and how learning by doing alters the
strategic interaction surrounding climate interventions.
Finally, three more potential extensions revolve specifically around cooperation.
First, several valuable robustness checks on our modelling assumptions in the general
n country case could be performed: modeling coalition and fringe decisions as simul-
taneous, in contrast to the Stackelberg leader assumption we have adopted; modeling
a coalition as an exclusive club, in contrast to our assumption of an open membership
game; and allowing, in addition to the SG coalition, a second CG coalition that deploys





















plored, for example, the potential of transfers and/or sanctions to enhance cooperation,
the implications of transaction costs or exit options, or other forms of cooperation treaties
that go beyond moratorium treaty and deployment treaty. One particularly interesting
question to consider would be how CG might interact with other indirect costs imposed
on unilateral SG and thereby affect prospects for cooperation. Lastly, the subject of
equilibrium selection is ripe for further research. Our results have demonstrated that
multiple stable cooperation equilibria are possible, and which one obtains determines
the ultimate desirability of climate interventions such as CG. Our assessment of CG
would be much more positive if we were sure that, where deployment and moratorium
treaties are both stable, the former materializes. In this sense it is of central interest to
understand which of multiple stable treaties is more likely to emerge.
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Appendix A Proof of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove (i) and (ii), begin with the ‘CG available’ case. The
best response functions lead to g∗A =
θ




2θ+1 T̄ + θ∆. It is straightforward to
see that g∗B < 0 iff ∆ < ∆̄. This is accordingly the free-rider region where it is inconsequential
whether CG is available or not. For ∆ ≥ ∆̄ we have a climate clash with g∗B ≥ 0 in the ‘CG
available’ case. In the ‘SG only’ case it is necessarily g∗B = 0 when ∆ ≥ ∆̄. Country A’s best
response is the free-driver level g∗A =
θ
θ+1TA. To show (iii) we look at the difference in payoffs











(θ2 + 52θ + 1)(∆− ∆̄)














2θ+1 (−T̄ )(∆− ∆̄) total welfare
(23)
Because of −T̄ > 0 and ∆ ≥ ∆̄, these quantities are always positive for country A and total




Proof of Proposition 2.
Moratorium Treaty. For country A,






− T̄ 2(θ + 34 ) + T̄ (θ +
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which is larger than ∆̄. The label indicates that we make use of this quantity in the ‘CG available’
case. See proposition 4. For country B,






− T̄ 2(θ + 34 ) − T̄ (θ +
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which is again larger than ∆̄. So neither country prefers the moratorium treaty over the free-rider
outcome.











2(2θ + 1)2(4θ + 1)
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which is positive at ∆ = 0. Because the expression has no positive root we see that country A











2(2θ + 1)2(4θ + 1)
[
T̄ 2 +2T̄ (8θ2+10θ+3)∆+(16 θ3+20 θ2+8 θ+1)∆2
]
which is positive at ∆ = 0. The unique root smaller than ∆̄ is
∆FreeRiderMax :=
−3− 4θ + 2
√
4θ2 + 5θ + 2
(4θ + 1)(2θ + 1)
T̄ (26)
So country B prefers the deployment treaty over the free-rider iff ∆ < ∆FreeRiderMax . It is straight-
forward to show that −3− 4θ + 2
√
4θ2 + 5θ + 2 < 0 and therefore ∆FreeRiderMax > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. We begin with the comparison of moratorium treaty and free-





























which is positive for ∆ > ∆SGMorat := −
θ+2
3θ+2 T̄ > 0.













2(θ + 1)(4θ + 1)
[
3T̄ 2 − 6T̄∆ − (4θ + 1)∆2
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and ∆SGMax > ∆̄. This means that country A prefers the deployment treaty to the free-driver












2(θ + 1)2(4θ + 1)
[
T̄ 2(2−θ) + 2T̄ (4+7θ) + (12 θ2+11 θ+2)∆2
]
.
The root larger than ∆̄ is
∆SGMin := −
7 θ + 4 + 2
√
3 θ3 + 9 θ2 + 9 θ + 3
12 θ2 + 11 θ + 2
T̄ (28)
At ∆ = ∆̄, the above expression is
−
2bθ(θ + 1)T̄ 2
(4θ + 1)(2θ + 1)2
< 0














, which is clearly positive.


























Proof of Proposition 4. The algebraic expressions for climate clash and free-rider equi-
librium are the same; because of that some relevant quantities have already been defined in
Proposition 2.
(i) That country A prefers the moratorium treaty over the climate clash iff ∆ > ∆CG,AMorat has
been demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 2. To see that country A always prefers





B )− πA(0, 0) = −
2bθ
4θ + 1
T̄ (2∆− T̄ )
which is positive due to −T̄ > 0.
(ii) That country B prefers the moratorium treaty over the climate clash iff ∆ > ∆CG,BMorat has
been demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 2. It is immediately clear that ∆CG,AMorat >
∆CG,BMorat. Comparing deployment treaty and climate clash, country B prefers the former iff
∆ is larger than
∆CGMin := −
(
3 + 4θ + 2
√
4θ2 + 5θ + 2
)
(4θ + 1)(2θ + 1)
T̄ . (29)





B )− πB(0, 0) =
2bθ
4θ + 1
T̄ (T̄ + 2∆) .




T̄ =: ∆BMorat,Treaty . (30)
(iii) For the moratorium treaty to be stable it is necessary that both countries prefer it over the
climate clash; this is equivalent with ∆ > ∆CG,AMorat. In addition, because of assumption 2,
only one of the two countries needs to prefer the moratorium over the deployment treaty.
From (i) we know that country A never prefers the moratorium, from (ii) we know that
country B prefers the moratorium treaty over the deployment treaty iff ∆ > ∆BMorat,Treaty.


















∆(2θ + 1) + T̄ (2θ + 3)
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and it is straightforward to show that ∆WelfareMorat,Driver is larger than ∆̄.
(ii) We have






− T̄ 2(4θ + 3) + (4θ2 + 4θ + 1)∆2
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Proof of Proposition 6. We prove part (i) and (ii) together. Consider the general n
country case. We use again θ = b/c and define βm =
mθ
mθ+1 and the average optimal temperature
change among the first m countries T̄ (m) = 1
m
∑m
i=1 Ti. The best response of country i to the
other countries’ geoengineering deployment level T−i =
∑n
j 6=i gj is characterized by the first order
condition dπi(gi;T−i)
dgi
= 0. In the ‘SG only’ world it is necessary to check whether the non-positive










θ+1 (Ti − T−i) CG available
(32)
The game consisting only of the firstm countries, i.e. them countries with the highest preferences
for cooling, has the equilibrium
g
(m)
i = θ(Ti − βmT̄
(m)) . (33)





(m). This is the equilib-
rium of the ‘SG only’ case if and only if country m + 1 considers the temperature reduction as
too much (and hence is unwilling to deploy more SG) and country m is willing to contribute SG
(i.e. the game of the first m− 1 countries results in a total temperature reduction that does not
exceed country m’s optimal reduction so that country m, due to vanishing marginal costs at the
point of non-contribution, is willing to deploy SG). This is the case iff
βm−1T̄
(m−1) > Tm ≥ βmT̄ (m) , (34)











≤ (1− βm)T̄ (35)
Define ∆(m) = 1−βm
min(0,βmδ̄(m)−δm+1) T̄ ∈ [0,∞] form = 1, . . . , n−1 and set ∆
(n) = 0 and ∆(0) = ∞.
It is easy to see that ∆(m) decreases in m. That (33) is the equilibrium of the SG only game
then is equivalent with ∆(m) ≤ ∆ < ∆(m−1). The equilibrium when CG is available is always
characterized by (33) with m = n the first m contributions being negative and the remaining
n − m positive. In the case n = 2 we have, as required, ∆(1) = T̄ and the quantities given in
Proposition 1 all coincide with (33), evaluated at m = 2 (free-rider and climate clash) or m = 1
(free-driver).
We turn to part (iii). Let m ≤ n be such that in the ’SG only’ case exactly m countries
deploy SG, ∆(m) ≤ ∆ < ∆(m−1). It is straightforward to see that the availability of CG decreases
welfare relative to the ’SG only’ case iff












(Tk − βmT̄ (m))2 > 0 (36)
We use (19) to write expression E as a quadratic function in ∆, E = C0+C1∆+C2∆
2. We find
C0 = (1 + θ)nT̄
2(1− βn)2 − (1 + θ)mT̄ 2(1− βm)2 − (n−m)T̄ 2(1− βm)2 (37)





































From Proposition 1 (iii) we know that E > 0 for all parameter constellations in the case n = 2. It
is cumbersome to analytically determine the parameter constellations for which E > 0 for general
n. We instead did a numerical analysis to get a sense of the conditions. The first observation
from this analysis is that the extreme free-driver setting, δ1 < 0 and δk = −δi/(n − 1), seems
to have the highest potential to result in E < 0, i.e. exceptions to the rule of welfare-decreasing
CG. In this extreme free-driver setting, we find constellations with E < 0 for all n ≥ 5 (whereas
an equidistant δ-profile has E < 0 constellations only for n ≥ 9). Constellations with E < 0 are
characterized by high levels of asymmetry ∆ and low benefit-cost ratios θ. Future research is
needed to analytically determine the conditions under which CG decreases/increases welfare in
the non-cooperative case.
Appendix B Calibration
For our parameter calibration we assume that countries base their decisions on benefits and costs
in a certain year. The reason is twofold. First, we have modeled climate intervention as a one-
shot (timeless) game in the first place, leaving more realistic models featuring a dynamic game
structure for future research. The second reason is that we focus on the short-term interaction
between SG and CG, leaving aside decisions with a long-term time profile such as choices on
mitigation and R&D; because costs and benefits of climate interventions in this model have the
same time profile, discounting does not affect the relative size of benefits and costs. We therefore
focus on benefits and costs in a certain year, all expressed in terms of USD in 2015, the year of
the most recent assessment of SG costs.
Benefit parameter b. Let g denote the growth rate. Burke et al. (2015) finds a quadratic
relation between temperature and growth, g = const + b1T + b2T
2 with b1 = 0.0127
◦C−1 and




(T − T ∗)2 (40)
with b̃ = −2b2 = 1/1000 ◦C−2 and T ∗ = − b12b2 = 12.7
◦C.
We now turn to the link between growth rate g and benefit function B, where we assume
that a country’s benefit function is given by GDP. The GDP as a function of temperature is
B(T ) = Y0(1 + g), where Y0 is the GDP at the beginning of the period. We can hence write
B(T ) = const−Y0 b̃2 (T −Ti)
2. For our analysis we assume that the countries are of the size of the
US. As explained above, we express all monetary quantities in terms of 2015 values. The GDP
of the US in 2015 was Y0 = 17.95 trillion $. The quadratic coefficient of the benefit function
b = b̃ · Y0 thus reads
b = 17.95 bn $/◦C2 . (41)
Cost parameter c. The following table reflects the best currently available estimates of
annual costs of stratospheric geoengineering with sulfur. The range of stratospheric sulfur load
is taken from Pierce et al. (2010). We assume a linear relation between sulfur load and cost, and
choose the mid-point of the range 2 to 8 billion $ for 5 Mt of sulfur load in National Research
Council (2015), referring to McClellan et al. (2012). A recent study by Smith and Wagner (2018)
shows numbers in the same ballpark. The effect of stratospheric load on changes in radiative
forcing is read from the SO2 scenario in Figure 4 in Pierce et al. (2010). The associated change
in temperatures is based on the climate sensitivity lambda=0.54 ◦Cm2/W , which corresponds
to an equilibrium temperature change of 2.1 ◦C (Shaviv 2005). We can then fit the model
C(T ) = c2 (∆T )
2 to the relationship between costs and temperature change and get






















Sulfur load (Mt) 0 2 5 10 20 McClellan et al. (2012)
Costs (bn $ ) 0 2 5 10 20 National Research Council (2015)
∆ RF (Wm−2) 0 0.9 1.8 2.8 4.1 Pierce et al. (2010)
∆ T (K) 0 0.486 0.972 1.512 2.214 Shaviv (2005)
Table 1: Available data for cost estimates of stratospheric geoengineering with sulfur.
Temperature parameter T̄ . The parameter T̄ captures by how much the average tem-
perature exceeds the optimum at the beginning of the global thermostat game. We assume that
preindustrial temperatures were on average optimal, and use for our numerical illustration Shaviv
(2005) with an equilibrium temperature change of 2.1◦C. This corresponds to T̄ = −2.1◦C.
Appendix C The timing of the global thermostat game
This section discusses the time structure of our model. There are two separate modelling as-
sumptions pertaining to the time structure: (i) the time structure of the non-cooperative global
thermostat game, in particular the temporal order of SG and CG, and (ii), in the context of
cooperation possibilities, the temporal deployment order of treaty members (’coalition’) and
non-members (’fringe’). We discuss both aspects separately.
Time structure of the non-cooperative game. In particular we here discuss the
relation between our model and Parker et al. (2018). Both our model and Parker et al. (2018)
fall into the class of models that abstain from modelling climate interventions as a full dynamic
game with repeated interaction. Within this class there are essentially three ways to model the
relative timing of SG and CG, illustrated in Figure 9 with the specific payoff structure from
Parker et al. (2018). The time structure of Parker et al. (2018) is depicted in Figure 9a: Country
A first decides whether to deploy SG, then country B chooses whether to deploy CG or not. The
unique Nash equilibrium in this setting is (No SG, No CG): The threat of CG deters country
A’s use of SG. Figure 9b shows the alternative sequential timing in which country B decides
on CG first, followed by country A’s SG decision (this timing obviously is only meaningful for
countervailing CG as neutralizing CG requires a previous SG deployment). The unique Nash
equilibrium with the reversed sequential order is (CG,SG). The use of SG makes sense for country
A irrespective of B’s decision; this, in turn, makes CG the only reasonable decision for B. So
we see that CG’s deterrence effect in Parker et al. (2018) crucially depend on the assumption of
country B ’having the last word’ on climate intervention. Note that the results also depend on
the payoff structure: one important case is if SG and CG are symmetric, for instance when ’no
SG / CG’ results in (−2, 1) instead of (−2,−2). Then the climate clash with a joint deployment
of SG and CG is the unique equilbrium of the game prediction, irrespective of the temporal
order.19
There is no logical reason why (countervailing) CG could not precede SG. In this sense, none
of the two sequential settings seems to be a plausible representation of the global thermostat
game. Therefore, the simultaneous game (represented in Figure 9c), which gives no technology
an advantage over the other in terms of the time structure, is the most plausible among the
three. The assumption of simultaneous SG and CG deployment (together with a richer action
space and payoff structure) has been adopted in our model, see section 2. We see that the unique
Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous variant of the Parker et al. (2018) game is (SG,CG), and
this is in line with our finding of the climate clash equilibrium. To summarize: The deterrence
effect in Parker et al. (2018) rests on the specific time structure. Other temporal orders of SG
and CG give rise to the analog of our climate clash equilbrium.































































Figure 9: Alternative time structures of the game in Parker et al. (2018). The payoff structure
is the same in all subfigures.
Temporal deployment order of treaty members and non-members. A separate
question regarding timing arises when we include the option of cooperation. The literature
has distinguished two assumptions on the relative timing of treaty members (’coalition’) and
non-members (’fringe’), see e.g. Finus (2008). Either members and non-members make their
decisions, here on climate interventions, simultaneously (’Cournot assumption’), or the coalition
moves first followed by simultaneous decisions by non-members (’Stackelberg leader assumption’).
For the case n = 2 both assumptions are equivalent; for our analysis with a general n in section
7 we adopted the Stackelberg leader assumption, leaving the comparison with the Cournot case
for future research.
Appendix D Welfare change induced by CG
Choices for the welfare-changing effect of CG. While the type of equilibrium only
depends on the benefit-cost ratio θ = b/c, the comparison of welfare levels, and therefore also
statements on the welfare changing effect of CG in Figure 5, is not determined by the choice of
θ alone. Two choices are needed in this context. The first choice is on b and c for a given θ.
Options include
(i) Keep b fixed. Then only c = b/θ varies with θ.
(ii) Keep c fixed. Then only b = θc varies with θ.
(iii) Choose b and c such that social optimal welfare does not depend on θ. Total welfare is
− 4b
2∆2+bc(∆2+T̄ 2)
4b+c . That this equals total welfare evaluated at reference values b0 and c0
(in our case the calibrated values in (12)) implies





2 + T̄ 2
4∆2θ +∆2 + T̄ 2
(43)





















The second choice we need to make is how to measure changes in welfare levels. Options include
(i) Focus on absolute welfare changes
(ii) Measure welfare changes in terms of the respective outcome in the ’SG only’ case
(iii) Measure welfare changes in terms of the respective social optimal outcome
On both questions we have chosen option (iii).
Country-specific welfare change. Figure 10 shows the country-specific welfare impact of
CG for n = 2; this effectively disaggregates the aggregate effect shown in Figure 5. As before, red
and green colors indicate a harmful and beneficial impact of CG, respectively. The plots suggest
that country A is typically worse off under CG, while country B benefits from the availability of
CG.
(a) Country A. (b) Country B.
Figure 10: The welfare impact of CG, differentiated into effects on country A and country B.
As in Figure 5, the welfare differences between CG and SG are normalized by the total welfare
under the deployment treaty. Note that the scale here is different from the [−100%, 100%] range
in Figure 5.
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